Problems of strike strategy: Decisions of the International Conference on Strike Strategy, held in Strassburg, Germany, January 1929 by International Conference on Strike Strategy
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements 
1-1-2029 
Problems of strike strategy: Decisions of the International 
Conference on Strike Strategy, held in Strassburg, Germany, 
January 1929 
International Conference on Strike Strategy 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political 
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact 
STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
International Conference on Strike Strategy, "Problems of strike strategy: Decisions of the International 
Conference on Strike Strategy, held in Strassburg, Germany, January 1929" (2029). PRISM: Political & 
Rights Issues & Social Movements. 798. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/798 
Problems 
OF 
Strike Strategy d 
Dw1~1nns of the lntrrnntio~lnl C t ~ ~ ~ f f r c u c e  on Strike Strategy 
Held in S t r ~ g b r ~ r q ,  Gernlnny, January, 182tl. 
A COMBMATION W3 AID IN THE STRUGGLE 
Ba4hgiveamm- 
e Wdem-d- d the I.bor 
MftdalO*1Dm42@ 
PAN PACIFIC UNIOW 
23BaE'rAmAT 
Thedm&p of 
the 8l?a 
d s o l o n f a l  P-- 
pIe is part of the 
""m - h a t  h o m e a  
in the colomiea. 
8- to boah PAN-PAOIPIC M01~tbl~-$2.00 Year 
LABm m (-PI per yarrr 
TOGETHER. . . . $2.50 
CONTENTS 
Pmf-WlIuam F* l)lmne. 
ForewartL& 
In- 
I. ~ ~ e ~ f w B ~ ~ L w k o n b .  
IL ~ m ' ~ ~ d ~ o l m d t h e ~ - t e a i  
B-[Im 
IIL Om TBO- in -WdIy Eiected Strike 
TV, Quibl08 atld Not aommands. 
v. T b e ~ 1 B e ~ S M k e ~ ~ t e e s d O h e B a i ~  
Trade Union rmmmracg; 
YI. The UaltEd h t  purlng StrLkes and XIwkorxts 
VII worked Iplokets aorl X)etanse -. 
m* 'Wlld4kt" or Uoofadal Strums. 
Ix, BmeMkmb~ the Flead of stroggk+The Pmumu of 
X. (]onUnnatlon ot the 8trnggIe Aftar ~ ~ v e  M v M a  by Uui 
Raforlukets. 
XL. m w  kJ mwmt tha DkmptPan oi Strllte& 
xm SiTilEea ht uotmklm wlth MvAdd hade unloa Movement& 
Xm. Strfltas in Fasdst apd Whtte Wroi CwlllWm. 
XIV. How to Qlve Poutlad aontemt to a- 
XV. Forms and Bletbdn of MtWkhg the IErade Udon m- 
(Left wing) fn AD  corm^. 
XVL Work ~mo& Warking Women and WmkIng Olase H- 
wivema 
XVlL Forms and Methods of MobWdng Yomg Workem 
XVIIL Organhkg Btrlka JMief. 
XlX m e  ProMem of Zniormatiw and UonmMom 
Eshbmmg Contaoh with TrMle Union Orgmm* fn 
0- ~ k i m .  
Bg rn Ihma 
Revolutionary strike ehhgy-the strategy which 
must be worked out and applied by the Trade Union Unity 
League and ita fllliated unions-is designed to secure the 
*tow of the working h both in iki everyday "bread 
and b a W t  strugglm and in the political ~ibcuggla into 
which every d o u s  econdmic conflict now develop8 almost 
fmm the first day of battle. 
The American working class, facing the moat power- 
fully organized and the best technicdIy equipped ruling 
clasa in the world, haa the need for studying its 
own stmggIes, learning their strong and weak pin&, and 
above all studying the rich experiences of the great con- 
flicts that have taken place since the world wm and the 
Rum4an.Revolution between workers and their robber rtrl- 
em in the principal impeWst and colonial countries. 
Especially must we study and draw the Iewna from 
+he tremendous &us conflicts now in pmgreas, conflicts 
which shake the whole imperialist world, *a battles that 
are widened and sharpened to revolutionary keenesa by 
the world economic crisis. 
To cmry out the greatest mobWtion of workem for 
each m t e  codlict, to be able to mass the whole atrik- 
ing power of our dam on the weakeat point of the enmy 
front in decisive conftida, to crtrrry through the OfFenafve 
and cowlidate our gains-#- are the h k s  of rp rew- 
lutionarg strike strategy. 
Fht and fornost our aMke strategy must be mch as 
to U e v a  the maximum immediate results from each sep- 
mate 8truggIe while guaranteeing that no atruggle rn 
rrrainrr isolated fmm the general direction of the c b a  
struggle asl a whole. It is here that the mvolutionarg nnl- 
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om of the Trade Union Unity League (T.U.U.L.) mme 
into sharpest coeonflict with the opgortuniflt cunceptioa of 
strike stnategy within oar own ranks, which seeti h ~ n e  
disk "gab" for workers from the standpoint of the 
d l  reformists. Thb conception makm a fahe and me- 
chanical distinction between the daily economic in-b 
of the mmrsma and the revolutionaxy aims, of the working 
class aer a whole, that must be brought forward in werg 
. 
etruggle. 
No such &tinction exists except in the minds of thm 
who see a aontdiction between the shggle for the 
everyday economic demands and the revoIutionarg. necmab 
ty of connecting them with the proletarian sfmggIe for 
power. 
The problem of building the r e v o l u t i o ~  unions of 
the T.U,U.Lthe American Section of the Red ][ntermk 
t i o d  of Labox U n i o n ~ r s  well as the problem of building 
a ma& Communist Party in the United States is Iargely a 
question of a correct strike strategy. With thia is bound 1 " up the pmbIem of destroying the reformist illusions of the 
Amerian Federation of Labor and the social fascists of its 
Muste wing whose program is that of the Socialirrt Party, 
Both of these problems are inseparable from the main 1. problem of winning thg. majority of the decisive. seetiom 
I of the working class for Communism. Seen from this 
, standpoint the importance of the question of working out 
and applying a correct strike skate# is brought dearly 
into the foreground-for our Party, for the revolutionary 
trade unions and for our whole &as. 
"It is clear that we must show the workers that we 
know not only how to make a revoIution, but a h  how to 
l a d  and direct their movements for partiaI demands, But 
the chief thing we must realize . . . is that the road from 
the dd-democrats to us Iiea -ugh the trade unions, 
through the trade union opposition, through the revolu- 
tionary trade unions, through tbe maser organizations (fm 
tory committea, strike commi- committees of unem- 
ployed, ek)''-Gommmist hianrational, page 48, vol. Vlf, 
No. 23. 
In other wdrds our l & d p  of the r e w l u t i o ~  ? 
struggle of our class can be won only through the m e  
l a m h i p  of ntmgglehl for p&M. demandst, -ugh our 
ability to o r g a n h  and lead the struggles of mass o&- 
mtions of workers for padid demmda. It is at best ex- 
t r e m e  doubtful whether any considertlb11 number of 
workera will believe' in our ability 'Lto make a revolutionr' 
unless we can or- and lead the &er but neassrtrJt 
stnrggles which arise out of rationalization, and in which 
we must be ibh to convince wurkem of 'the neceasitg of' 
engaging in higher foma of struggle. 
The retsoltltiom and d d s i m  of the hterxfatiomd Con- , 
ferenm on Strike Btmtegy held in SIma&up&, called by 
the Executive Bureau of the Ited Intematiod of b b x  
Uniioas (RJLU,) embody in mnmte fonn the experi- 
ences and lessons of the c h s  ~truggle on a world 4 e :  
&If d t i c b m  in the ldnis t  sense wss the method used 
to determine the wedm- and the strength of the 
proletarian forces involved in en whole series of ~tmgg1e8. 
As Comrade h m l q  says In the Toreword": W e  
cannot limit ourselves to our forefathers' wisdom; we, 
mlutioxu~ry dialecticians, must direct our attention b 
new factors, new situatim, and base omelves on t h w  
new f b r s  in analyzing these problems. Facta themIves 
h v e  proven that the r e f o d t  .trade union bureaucmw 
has become a part of the bourgeois government, having 
the.sp&al Atn&w of b d n g  1-a. This bing so, 
we muat seek ways and mama of arming on the 
mic ~ h g g l e  without and despite the reformist 
bmeaucracy," 
New forms and metbods of 
Worker madm will find 
of the new fonm d me f 
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of the shmpenhg class struggle in thh imperialist epoch 
--and also how to organize and use them, 
The united front from below ap~ar8  in its most con- 
crete form in almost every section of the resolutioru and 
decisions of the Stmsburg conference. 
Out of these new f o r m  and methods of struggle, and 
the massee of the working class whose wetapom they am, 
out of the struggle itself, develop the new and neces- 
sary force8 to lead the growing conflih which more and 
more become struggles against capitalism and its govern- 
mat--political struggle8 in which the problem of power 
k raised in one form or another. 
In "New Tactics and New Forces" Lenin wrote in 
1906: 
"From all sides one hears with equal frequency passion- 
ate appeals for new forces and complaints of the absence 
of people in the organizations, and at the same time a 
gigantic offer of services, a growth of young forces, esp- 
tially among the working class . . . . . The practical or- 
ganizer who complains of shortage of people in such con- [ ditions cannot see the wood for the trees, admitq that he is blinded by events, that it is not he, the revolutionary, who dominates them . . . . but that they are dominating him or have overwhelmed him. Such an organizer would be well advised to keep quiet, or to leave his place free for young forces, which have energy . . . . There are pcople, 7 there is a mass of people. We have only to throw over- board our $hilist' ideas and teachings to give space for action and initiative, and then we shall prove ourselves worthy represenbtives of the great revolutionary claas." More forces are needed but they can come only from 
the ranks of the new contmngents of the working class 
that are marching into struggle. Correct strike strategy 
correctly applied will bring f o m r d  the needed forces. 
Tried and tested by its ability to use the new forms and 
methods of struggle, the revolutionary leadership of our 
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&us develops 'out of the clam ahggle and collective ex- 
periences similar to those from which are drawn the prao- 
t id  mnclusions of the S W b a r g  ~ n f e m o e .  
The Amdam worldng elms will reap a rieh hamest 
from the stndy of this pamphlet and in turn, by applying 
the lessom herein aontained, wia, be able to add to Ita 
growing sum of achievemenh in the United Statedi and 
give revolutionary proletarian aid to the millions of work- 
ers and colonial peoples who are marching forward under 
the revolutionary banne~  of tbe Communist International 
and the Red International of Labor Unions. 
FOREWORD. 
A Empean conference to study the 
recent economic atrugglgle8, &led by the 
the Red International of Labor 
held in Strassburg, Germany, in the btter part of 
of this year. Thb conference wilI 
gortmce in determining the direction of the whole r m ~  
, , lutionary trade union movement, and participants were themselves in direct lead-Kp of tha 
struggles, and were, so to to&, on the very field of 
action, is very significant. 
Altho several important mnflid (M and Ruhr) 
have alxeady ended, we have on the,other h d ,  a whole 
aeries of new conflicts, and a review of even the prelimi- . 
nary m n l t s  is of the utmost importance to all those htezL 
ested in the complex quelitions of strike strategy d 
tactics. It is, of course, possible g e n e d y  to avoid e- 
ing these questions, or ta awider them from the view- 
point of the former membem of the German Communist 
Par€y (the expelled Right Wing-Trans.) to whom the 
seems monstrous. They, having learned from childhood, 
very idea of independent leadership of emnomic s w e a  
that economic struggles ehoutd be led by the M e  uniom, 
repeat these acquired laws, completely ignoring the pec~r ' liaritie~ in the situation, the condition of the trade unions . 
t and generally the facts in the m e .  For them proecial politicians there is nothing new in the world, and that ie why their conception of Communist tactics takes on the form of a refrain to the melodies of the left dem- ocrats. We cannot limit ourselves to our forefathem' wisdom; 
we, as moIutionaxy dialectidmu, muat ddirect our atten- 
tion to new factom, new situations, and base o d v a  on 
these factors in analyzing these problems. Faeta t b -  
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selves have proven that the reformist trade union bureau- 
cracy has become a part of the bourgeois government, 
the special function of breaking strkm. This being 
w, we must seek ways and means of camring on the I 
ewnomic struggle witbout and deq* the refo&t aade 
@on bureaamcy. And it was on this premiae that the 
Profintern (B.KL.U.) d e d  the conference on the question 
of strike strategy and tactiw. 
Fkpresentatives from England, Germany, Hungary, 
Fbmce, Austria, Belgium and Poland participated in the 
conference. Every participant told of hki own recent ex- 
periences. Inasmuch ora the conferenm waa not &led for 
mutual eulogies, but for the etudy of positive and nega- 
tive experiences, the reports on strikes and on the diffi- 
d t i e a  aria- in the process of the struggle were a e  
aompanied by sharp criticism of our weaknesses and short- 
comings. And our wakneases and shorbmings in North- 
ern France, in the Rubr and in Lodz, were not few. 
But this was nat criticism for criticism's sake, nor 
malicious rejoicing by Eiome expelled membera of the Ger- 
man Communist Party over -failures, but healthy WE- 
criticism for the purpose of overcoming our wwkne~es 
and misbkes. Altho the Vomarts" and its allies from 
"~minst he C m n t "  take advanhe of this 8eIf-ti~- 
ism for their right and left social democratic purpuses, 
this shall not d e k  us from continuing the line of self- 
- criticism in the future, and especially when we are faced 
krith concrete tactical problems, 
Arrayed against the adherents of the Red International 
of Labor Unions is a united front of employers, bourgeois 
governments, social democrats, Amsterdamites, and former 
members of the Cornintern (Communist International) 
who are now against any attempts of the revolutionary 
opposition to independently lead the economic gtmggles 
08 the proletariat. The difficulties a in this task are enor- 
mow, and therefore mistakes and shortoomings are in- d 
witable, but theae will be cone&& not in moaw .@ d$& 
treri4 but thnr the fires of struggle and severe> .I&& 
e r i t i h .  This is the opinion of all revolutionary w d @  I -f all those who recognize that there hi ao i ~ k k  way of ovemmhg these difficulties thrm tk t  out by the IV Congress of the R.I.L.U. 
What pmblem~l did the conference have under d d &  
ation? This will be seen from the resolution w M  fob 
lowa. Here we find the question of preparation for the 
I rrtruggle, of the i n s h e n b  to be employed, the 
and methods of Iendership, the participation of the 
strata and ~tegories of workem, qumtiom of 
formation, ommunicatiom, elfdefense, e k  
tiom widered  at this conference &ace dl p 
the emmmic struggle, Taking as its base the de&om 
of the UI and W Congresses of the R.I.L.U. the confer- 
ence approached the ~ t a i k e  as rr fom of warfare, & 
therefore attempted to outline methods of dense  and de 
feme for 'the militant working dass army, enab?hg it to 
secure a maximum degree of success in battle. Social-dem- 
oerrrtic strategists and theft understudies, gathered mund 
the journal "Against the Current" will, cif coarse, say that 
such attempts are doomed to failure, I t  is hpossible, 
they wilt say, to foresee aU that might happen, Thk 
certainly ia correct. It is impossible ta foresee atl. Ye& 
if we were to accept this point of view, we would  imply 
have to deny the very possibility of a military science. 
Pet, military schools, notwithstanding, are haching stmrt- 
egg and tactics. A critical anetly~is of the egperiencerr of 
previow wars and of each battle sepmtely ia given sla3 
the basic mume material for the study of military ~ c i m  
in every country. my, then, m n o t  m analysis and study 
of the gigantic economic battles render us instructive 
material? It is only reformist narrow-mhdednese which 
m o t  see the use and necessity of drawing lemons f h m  
struggles. 
This does not mean that the conference could g r e d b e  
a recipe applicable to dl emergencies. The conference 
codd give attention to m e  particular questions, studg 
the mistakes in order to avoid them in the future, em- 
phasize those methods which have been advmtqgwu~Jy 
applied, so aa to again utilize them against our enemies-- 
in a word, out of the experiences of our last struggIes 
barn the proper lessons for the coming struggles. Thia 
is not only poaaible, but absolutely necesstwy. If the re- 
formists do not do this, it is only bemuse they wish to 
avoid the struggle, because they are not grepawiug for 
class war, and therefore are not in the lewt interested 
in learning lea;50ns of a s s  w m .  
With the dasa struggle sharpening, all prattle abut 
&ss colaboration, geolce in industry, economic demo-, 
e k ,  is nothing more nor lew than a smoke hlcreen behind 
which reformist strategy is hiding. This is the form and 
method of disrupting the proletarian front and the prole- 
tarian rear in the interests of our elws enemies. That is 
why, in studying the experiences of strike strategy, it 
necessary Jw, at the same time to give our serious atten- 
tion to the question of how to expose the mmouvem of 
the united fmnt of the bourgeoisie with the reformkb 
against the fighting proletarian army. 
As the resolution is very detailed rrnd ap& fox it- 
s&, we shall d e  no comments here. Every &a con- 
scious worker rnuat study it carefully, point by pohk It 
would be an exaggemtion to say that the following 
solution has taken into account every emergmq, but there 
is no doubt at all of the fact that many important ex- 
periences have been aopuired. It is the duty of all the 
adherents of the R.I.L.U. to ~upplement these experiences, 
to add to them, to test them in the coming etruggles, and 
upon the basis of the strickst check-up and d-cr i t idam 
1 contime further dong the path of independent leadenhip 
in economic struggle8. 
Such politicians will be found (there are many writing 
in the organ "Against the Current") who will say that 
the attempts to work out tactic8 for the economic struggle 
is mamho-~iyndiwlism (see the phenominal discovery of 
Walcher in No. 3 of "Aminst the Current"). This is 
amrdwsyndicaIism, they say, because here is a m p b  
between the economic and political struggles of the prole 
tariat. But Walcher wilI not be successful in evading u 
serious question merely by calling it auarcho-syndicalism. 
Walcher, like dl opportunists, evinces a great desire to 
count the Communist International (hereafter abwviated 
. C*L-Ed.) and the Red International of Labor Union8 
anarcho-syndicalist institutions; but this is nothing more 
than attempting assault by foul means. In these deckions 
there cannot be found the slightest indication of a rupture 
between the economic and politica1 phases, nor any at- 
tempt b place the economic battle above the po l i t id  
battle. The existence of the inter-relationship between 
economic and politiea1 battles has been established by the 
R.I.L.U. from the very day of its inception and by no 
means can or should this prevent the examination of any 
questions arising out of economic dashes. Today every 
economic conflict is inherently politicaI in character, and 
to try to find misbkes in the R.LL.U. along this line, ia 
simply a waste of time. A review of experiences is a 
most important step towards effective leadership in the 
coming struggles. b 
Thk is what the conferenm held at Strassburg pro- 
I chimed, and this is what every adherent of the R.I.L.U. must devote his attention to. 
* * * 
The conference made no decisions on the question of 
the unorganized, considering, and correctly so, that this 
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and the C.I. Thids question is a new one. Recent struggles 
have proven the militancy of tbe unorganized, and there- 
fore the problem of organizing the unorganized, the forms 
and meth& of organizing the unorganized, must be are 
fully studied. The fact that during the process of a h g -  
gle, the question of the unorganized has reached the center 
of attention, that this question has become one of the 
points of diversion for the group8 leaving the Communist 
International; that former Corrrmuniets are attacking the 
Cornintern (C.I.) a d  Profintern (R.I.L.U.) especially on 
this point; that on this question they are in complete 
agreement with the social-democra-1 this is evidence 
of the fact that the Communist Intmmational and the 
Profintern have touched upon the 80Te spot of intermtion- 
d reformism. 
The most important thing here ia experience, lstndying 
the extent of organization, the form and character of the 
unorganized participation in ;struggl~, the means of main- 
taining influence over the unorganized masses after the 
termination of strikes, etc. This question is new, thk 
qnestion is complex and requires an exhaustive dism~ion. 
Therefore, the conference acted correctly h making no 
decision on this question. 
It ia the duty of dl the adherents o f  the R.I.L.U. to 
make s thorn study of the expriencea in all muntriea, to 
dmw broad drclea of revolutionary trade union l&em, 
aa well as rank and file members of the bade unions, into 
the discussion, in order ta faditate a final decision on the 
b a h  of mllective experiehceg sand debiled discussion. We 
a= convinced that the decisions made by the Corninten1 
and Profintern will be reached in auch a manner, and not 
in amordance with the views indicated by gronpa expelled 
from the Cornintern. 
As we have aha& stat&, the d W o m  wcepW b~ 
the conference are ao detailed that they reqm no mmk 
ment. We request th8t dl of you, readem -oi the rev* 
lutionary labor press, express your views upon the qmb 
tiona d d t  with by the conference. The more work* 
participating in this discussion, the more expdenw t&em 
into acmunt, the better will it be for the r e v o l n ~  
trade union movement;. Every adherent of the R.I.L.U. 
wiU understand the reason for working out such detailed 
resolutions. The workers must not be frightened by rn 
series of new problems. Our adherents must understand - 
that we will have to travel new paths, and establish new , 
landmarks, while under the fire d our class enemies, of 
social reformism and capitalist class supporters. An open 
discusdon of all these questions will be of great assistance 
to the whole molutionary trade union movement. H d  
lies the significance and importance of the Interntionid 
Conference on Problems of Strike Strategy and Tactia 
A. ILomvsrky, 1929. 
PROBLEMS OF STRIKE STRATEGY 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON STRIICE STRATEGY. 
The tremendous economic conflicts and battles which 
have occurred since the IV Congress of the Profintern in 
a number of countries--Germany, Poland, fiance9 Greece, 
etc., involving and hundreds of thou-& of workers, 
baa unquestionably confirmed not only the correctness of 
the economic and political analysis made by the angress 
with respect to the I- m p i w t  oountriea, but dm 
the ~orreck.le&s of the strike strategy and tactics outlined 
by it. 
From t h e  very moment of inception, and in some case& 
during the pmc&s of development, thew strikes and lock- 
outs were marked fbt ,  by their mass and political char ' 
acter, and aecond, by the definite manifestation of de 
menb of offensive and oounter-offenstive on the paxt of 
the workem. 
There can be no doubt whatsoever that With intensi- 
fied mtiondization, the growing capitalist offensive and 
the increasing activity of the toiling masses, we now 
find ourselves at the beginning of a growing movement 
of politid and economic dashes between Iabor and capital.. 
And it is dm certain that only real, revolutionary leader- 
ship can insure the rsuwessful outcome of these battles. 
These conditions make it imperative upon the adhemta 
sf the R.I.L.U. to bend every effort to wres t  leadership 
out of the hands of the treacherous labor fakers and to8 
take upon ourselves independent leadership in economic 
struggles. 
Among the mng difficult and intricate obstacles con- 
fronting the revolutionary trade unions and the adherents 
of the Profinkm, it is most imperative to overcome the 
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oppothmbt tendencies of the l e ~ s  stable elements in our 
own ranks who have fdm under the influence of the 
reformists. These opportunist tendencies are expremed 
in bade union legality (fear of violating the constitution, 
obedience to the orders of the reformist buxeaucrata, e k , )  
in falling behind the masses, in the underestimation of the 
militancy of thb masses, in an inadequate understanding I 
of the connections existing between the economic end 
goEtieal struggles. These opportunist &takes very  harp- 
ly manifest& themaelves during huge economic conflicb 
when it was n e w m y  to urn the utmost exertion, end* 
an=, flexibility and the ability 20 apply the revolutionary 
M c s  hid down by the IV Congre~e. All wavering and 
vacillation in our own ranks must be most drastically 
and decisively eradicated at once. 
One of the weakest wink in the work of the rev* 
l u t i o ~  trade unions and the trade union opposition, B 
the inadequate study of the experiences gained in the 
struggle. The strike wave of even the lollst few months 
has rendered a w d t h  of materid which must be well 
utilized in the approaching etruggles. The fight for h- 
dependent leadership in economic conflicts, is steadily 
becoming more and more of a gene& phenomena in face 
of the continued, bmzen strikebreaking role of the refom- 
ist trade union bureaucmcy. However, the forms and meth- 
ods of the struggle change, depending upon the apedie 
conditions of a given industry, the rehrtiorwhip of fo- 
in the working class, etc. 
How ahall this struggle be carried on? W b t  Wm- 
men& must be mated? How is the offensive ofthe ?mews 
.and the reformists to be paralyzed in the process of the' 
ehggIe? How are t h e  unorganized, the women and tbe 
young worken to be drawn into the struggle? Roa b I 
the whole working elarcs to be mobilized to aid the 'work 
I I era? such are the questions confronting every partidpant . i 
and leader of present day economic strugg1es. And hem . 
I I 
I 1 
PROBrnkTS OF STRIKE 8TRATRGY 
the experiences in Lob would have been very beneficial 
- to Germany and France. The experiences in France miffht 
have been useful in Germany, and the German experiences . 
might have been of benefit to other countries. We do not 
~ufficiently study the lessons of how and what has been 
done. Frequently, we apply tactics as of old, and we h-; 
provise even in such cases where experiefice has already 
proven the sucee~~ful application of some form, of some 
method of f truggle. 
That is why it is the task of the adhemnta of the 
Pmfintern to most carefully study every economic con- 
ac t .  We must Iearn to overcome all the difficulties in 
our path. We mu& ;sanely judge oar weakne~es and 
shortcomings. Only on the basis of a deWled analysis of 
the positive and negative experiences of past economic 
conflicts can we take an important step f o m x d  in prepar- 
ing our own ranks and the whole working class for the 
threatening clasa battles between labor and capital. 
I. PREPARING THE MASSES FOR STRIKES AND 
I@CKOUTS 
The experiences of recent strikes in Frmce, Germany 
and Poland have ahown that there has not been sufficient 
preparation for these 8trikes and lockouts. In order that 
the workers shall not be taken unawares, the b d e  union 
opposition and the independent revolutionary unions must 
carry on their work in the following manner: 
1. It is the duty of every revolutionary union and the 
trade union opposition (left wing) in every industry to 
organize the workers for future conflicts and strugg1~. 
2. At the first apparance of symptom of growing 
dimtisfaction on the part of the workers, or aggressive 
intentions on the part of the employem, in a given in- 
dustry, the question of an approaching conflict must be 
brought sbrply before the maase8. 
P 
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8. Preparatory agitatiod and o x ~ t S o n r s l  d' 
must be carried on under the following dqps: "Do 4 
rely on the trade union bureaucrats J" "Taks the init- ' 
in your own hands!" "Set up your own o e k b n $  
forms!" 'Trepare for the struggle, otherwb you will h& 
defeated!" In this agihtional work all concrete wear sTle 
treachery by the trade union bu-ucqacy in recent won- 
omic struggles must be utilized. 
4. It is neceasarJr during thk preparatory period, tbm 
personal conversations and pressure at meetings ta dngb 
out those elemenb among the non-Pam, refombt, e 
do-syndicalist or mtholic workera who may be dmwn 
into the stmggle against the employers on the basis of . 
our independent tactics, i.e., not dependent on the trade 
union bureaucracy, and to participate together with the 
revolutionary workers. in our independed instrumenh of 
struggle  hop committees, strike committees, mmmiWer 
of action, eh.-Ed.). q 
6. The economic demands must be clear and under- 
atandable to the masses, muat corn4 as a result of a an- 
m t e  situation, must be discussed by all workers involved, 
for only under such circumstanm can these demanda ab 
tract the majority of the workers and become the baais 
of a united front from below and of uniM action. 
& During the preparatory period an important mle 
may be played by conferences of &op and factory rep* 
sentatives, or conferences of shop committees, providing 
that the latter are not under the influence of the reform- 
ish and are not instmmenh of dass-oolIaboration. 
7. The revolutionary trade unions and the trade anfm 
opposition must carefully examine and constan~y check 
up on the work of all its imtrumenh, from the viewpoint 
of contact with the mass of workers in the variotm fw- 
h i e s .  EspeciaUy must all signs of red tape or bureau- 
hindering them from reacting quickly to any dqelopemt 
among the work ex^ be combatted. 
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8. The revo~utionarg trade unions and the M e  union 
opposition must carry on all of ita prepxtory work in 
such a manner that the need for creating militant h s h -  
ments to lead the strnggIe ~hould emanrrte from the rank 
and file workers. This question &ouId become the subject 
of discussion in all factories and ahopa. 
9. At the approach of a Ioekout, it is necessary to b 
aue dogans for the creation of mil i ta~t  cmmithea of 
stmecggle against the lockout, elected in the factory by a11 
the workm, ~ g a r d l e a a  of their Party and trade union 
affiliations, organized or unorganhed. 
10. In case of Pavorable conditions- for a strike, and 
with a militant mood gremihg among the masses, the 
creation of strike comms'tteea (this also holds true in thoae 
cases where the  trike I8  led by revoIutionary trade unions) 
elected by all workera should be undertaken, Workers of 
all beliefs and afiliations must participate in these elections, 
the organized, aa well as the unorganized. 
11. At the same time, the sharpest agitation and 
pmpaganda must be d e d  on among the mawa a-t 
the a p p o i ~ t ~ t  of sMke committees from the top (i.e., 
by the bureaucrateMne.) and against efforts of the 
trade union bureaucrats to transfer the leadership in these 
conflicts to  such committees. 
12. Prepamtion of the working masses for the strug- 
gle must be d e d  on not only orally, but also in the 
presa. In this regad the trade union and Psrtg. press is 
taxed with ID serious duty. It is neees~ary to iswe ape& 
ldeter, special supplements of the press, 8h0p g a w ,  
etc., dealing with the approaching conflict. 
13. f t  ia mmt dangemus in the emmmic struggle to 
call a strike, or impmvbe one, under the influence of a 
passing mood, and nut &er cold calculations. -ern 
are required to poawss complete i n f o m t i w  not only 
about the condition of zb given branch of hdushy, but 
also about what is going on among the m m .  The task 
lies in not being tardy, wt dansling in tbe but 
the ability to grasp the readhas of ~JM mnannn to 
And even then, the task i~ not to declare a a 
would pronounce w decree, without mbus 
preparation of the masses for the struggle. 
14. The selection of the h e  for the d e c k a h  d# I 
the strike Is e s g W y  imporhnk In thirs comectio~ . _ 
experiences ia Lo&, where the deckmation waa , 
mwt carefully ba studied. The selection of am '- 
moment may predetermine an unfavorabIe end to the am- ' \  
flick !his k why, dter lengthy prepamtiona, the d b  . 
tion of the abike must be timed at the moat fammbb 
moment for the workers. The selection depends upon the 
-situation, time and place, upon the relationship of fome~, 
Ipoliciea of the bosses, etc, 
1 
4 
'C 
15. In the preparatory period it hi necesmry to mbb : 
the question of a strike fund for the ahikers or the lock- I 
d 4 u t  workers, espechlly in those countriehi and thoae 
unions which do not have strike funds. Altho it ia m n g  
to rely upon the ability of the workers to gain a victory 
over the h s e s  merely on the baais of a full W u r y ,  it 
is equally wmng to postpone the consideration of  way^ 
and means af aiding the strike= and locked out workem . 
(fiance) until after the struggIe has already   started . 
IL THEl M)=, CHARAWR AND FUNCTIONS OF 
TIIE INSTRUMENTS OF STRUGGLE* 
All of the preparatory period must be utilized for ex- 
plaining to the workers involved the neaeasib of o r g d w d  
' preparation for the struggle. Thia means that we rwt  
populmh the mmmitteers of ~truggle against Iockonh, 
strike committees, special commissions which must take 
the leadership of the straggle upon tbemselvea. In the 
aixe of an appmwhing lockout it is necessary to begin 
elections for committew of ~ m g l e  m t  lwkoutg. And 
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8 few days before the cding of a strike, it is necessary 
to begin elections of strike committees. It is always neces- 
sary  to commence elections of anti-Ioelrout committeen or 
strike committees a few days  before the declaration of the 
lockout or the strike. In cue a lockout is decIared un- 
expectedly, or if a strike arises suddenly, or dm if it is 
impossible to have the committees elected in due time, 
it is necessary at the moment of the d h m t i o n  of the 
strike or lockout, while the workers have not yet dis- 
pemed, ta arrange a general meeting of the workers at 
which, after due agitation, a proposal for the election of 
a committee should be made, naming for thia parporn a 
prepared list of revolution&, reformist, amrcho-syndical- 
iplt, catholic and non Party workers. 
With regard to the compo&ivn of the strike com- 
mittee, it ia espcidly important that the elections for 
strike committees be c a d &  on in dl shops and even in 
craft  group^, and that they be widely representative of 
all the ahgoriw and groups of workers, aa for inatan=, 
the shop delegations in Lo&. The election syshn should 
be determined accurding to the extent of the conflict and 
the shops involved. The more strike committe~ there we, 
the easier it will be for them to guide the maas of 
workers. In small shops the strike committee may be 
electad on the bmia of one for every 25 to 60 workera; 
in larger shops one out of every 100 to 200. In the vew 
large factories where tens of thousands of workers are 
employed, the strike committee should consist of from 
200 to 800 geopIe. Such large reprewnhtive strike can- 
mittees mast elect their own executive commitbea, whose 
duty it would be to arrange regular meetings of all the 
mwnbera of the committee, be responsible to them, keep 
them informed, keep contact th them with the qtrikem 
. by assigning to each member of the strike committee de- 
fmite reaponaibilitiea. With mgwd to the functions af the 
strike committees, and their tasks, it ibi necessary for 
them to attain the following: 
1. The atrike committee has the task, employing all 
means, to carry on the struggle for the &ation of the 
workers' demands. The auccesafnl termination of the 
struggle will depend upon the extent to which the strike 
committee is successful in eliminating the influema of the 
dormis t  union from the factory and in taking the Ieade~" 
ship of the strike out of its  hand^, - 
2. The strike committee m u ~ t  lead the shggle, enter 
into negotiations and sign agreements if neoetisary, d e  
dazing at the outbreak of the strike that any agreements 
entered into by the reformi~t bureaumats are not binding 
upon the workem. 
3. The strike committee must be mrutantly dert to 
every move of the trade union bureaucrat., When they enter 
into machinatiom with the bosses, demonstratiom should 
be orgauized in front of tbe building8 where they me 
located and a systematic campaign should be d e d  on 
to undermine the faith eapecidly of social-democratic and 
catholic workem in the r e f o h t  and catholic trade union 
bureaucracy. 
4. Strike committees must become the powerful tools 
in the hands of the trade union opposition with which to 
drive all agents of the bosses and aMea of the b o w  out 
of the b d e  uni011. 
6. The strike committees must draw the  hop com- 
mittees into full participation in the struggle, but if the 
latter should trail after the trade bureaucrats, then 
the strike committee must carry on as severe a fight 
against them as against the trade union bureaucmcy. 
6. The ba~ic task of the strike committee is, not d y  
to concenhte the attention of .the masses on the slogma 
put forth in our s t r u g g l e ,  but what is 
important, to supplement the original slogans in tbtn 
come of struggle, with new do-, includh aoW 
demands, depending upon the new situations and the 
chauging conditions, never pedtting the initiative to dip 
from ita hands. 
7. The strilre cumnittee cannot and mwt not adopt 
the attitude of "All or Nothmg". It must be capable of 
maneuvering (of a m ,  not in the rJense of malriag top 
combinations) and quickly and correctly determining which 
aide will hnd to benefit by a change in the relationship 
of fomes which occurs during the process of the struggle. 
Unnecessary rigidity and insufficient flexibility is CQ)D.- 
to dl practices of revolutionary clasz3 warfare. 
8. For the n o d  leadership of a h i k e  or lockout, 
the strike oommiths or the anti-lockout aommittees must 
unite all the workers involved in the conflict, In the case 
of big lockouts or strikes, embxacing a number of factories 
in s large district, or a whole bran& of industrg, it is 
necessary to create a central strike committee on the 
bash of representation from local strike committees. 
9. Demomatidly elected strike or mti-lockout corn- 
rnittees must establish the etricted discipline within the 
committees in order to secure a successfd bmhution to 
the struggle. 
10. During the election of militant anti-1dtout com- 
mittees, or strike committees, it is necessary to secure a 
decision providing for the right to recall those tnmbel% 
of the committee who may afterwards refuse b execute 
the tasks imposed upon them for the energetic &ng 
on of the struggle, thus violating the will of their eIectom. 
f 1. The militant anti-lockout committees, strike com- 
mittees and other instruments of struggle must bot om 
see to it that all workers involved in the conflict are 
regularly registered, but also to establish regular control 
centers for the purpose of strengthening connections with 
and utiIizing the greatest possible number of workers for 
active participation in the struggle. 
12. The strike c0mmitk.s must establish and maintain 
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the closest oontaeta between the: 
unempIoyed workers in order to fmstra 
utilize the unemployed in disrupting the 
nx. OUR TACTICS IN DEMOCRATI 
STRIKE COMMTJXES. 
The strike committee, being an instrument elected k$ 
the mas~es, must necessarily be composed of workers d f  
various beliefs and affiliations (religious, political, eh ; )  
therefore, in the preliminary stage8 of the struggle, the 
adherenh of the R.I.L.U. may even find themselves in the ,, 
minority. In such cases the revolutionary workers mt : 
manifest the greatest patience and bct, and the abilik 
to convince the majorits of the need of revolutionary 
tactics. 
F'irst of all, whenever the question arises of ~hmpenhg 
and broadening the struggle, the adherents of the R.LL.U. 
must be the most disciplined and self-sacrificing members 
on the strike commitbe. Untiringly, at all meetings of 
the strike committee, must they criticise the indehive- 
ness, vacillation and hesitation of the reformist and cathe 
lic leaders and expose their machinations. Tn caw the 
strlke committee should waver, the adherents of the Prof- 
intern must demand that the question of the continnation 
of the struggle be presented to a meeting of the shikem 
for a decision. If this demand ia not granted, our followera 
must go before the masses of the strikers- and raise the 
question of the re-election of the strike committee, prop- 
in8 to replace the hesitant ones with more decisive and 
1 .  determined leaders. 
SimultaneousIy with the withdrawal of the revolution- 
ary minorities from a strike committee which had3 fallen 
under the influence of the reformists, the minority must 
appeal to the mass of workem and organhe- the election 
of a new strike commithe in order to continue the shg-.  
gle. 
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In e x m e  cases when the majorit9 of the m d t t e e  
falls under the influence of the reformists and breaks a . 
strike at a time when the mass of workem sti l l  show a 
readiness to continue the struggle, the revolutionary wing 
must and should withdraw from the strike committee. 
The adhemh of the R.I.L.U. must organhe the masses 
to directly control the activities and work of the stxike 
committee and resolutely fight againat all tendencia to 
make the strike committee merely a auberidiary body of 
the union, even if the union be a revolutionary one (nod-  
ern France). The fundamenu task of the adherents of 
the Profintern id3 to bring their beat mid most energetic 
workers, by means of demomtic elections, into these 
lealing mrnmiks as memberar. By their energetic ex- 
ample and consistent &s line, by always acting in a 
reqonsible organized manner, by never betraying 'the 
masses who have elected them, and by winning the confi- 
dence of the masses, these revolutionary members must 
win the leadership of these committees, camyhg with 
them the rank and Pile workem of various beliefs. 
The h k  of the adherents of the R.LL.U. is to 
strengthen the confidence of the masses in the hstru-  
merits of struggle (the ommittma) and actually lead the 
masses by means of the non-Ptg strike and anti-lockout 
committees. 
IV. GUIDANCE, AND NOT COMMANDS. 
A strike or lockout which involves broad masses of 
workers creates fhvorable conditiom for widening, the in- 
fluence of the revolutionary wing of the labor movement. 
Ebwwer, this influem can grow only if the leading ele- 
menta manifest an acute sensitiveness to the desire8 of 
the masses and establish a healthy relationship between 
the strike committee md the striking workers. 
The strike committee must be able to keep in constant 
touch with the mwsea, continually reporting ta them, re-l 
inforcing ibelf by adding new energetic dements fro1 
- among the strikers who have shown initiative, and carr~r-1 
. ing on its work in ~uch a manner that the workers a 
k e e p  control over the committee. I 
It is especially dangerous for the strike cornmi- 1 
resort to commanding the strikem ; to endeavor wbitra-l 
rily to decide important questions, or to go so 
reject certain demands or to a l l  off the strike. 
This system of cammands, as well as secret 
must be ruthlessly eliminatd from the procedure of .tl 
strike committees, the role and importance of which w 
grow only insofar rn they are controlled by the maswa,[ 
and together with the masses decide on dl impo 
auestions of the  strike. 
The control of the masses over the strike committee, > 
and the constant contact of the strike commitbe with il 
masses, naturally does not exdude the posaibiIity of tl 
strike committee in mrtato exceptional cirmtancw,l 
making immediate independent decisions and reporting i 
action to the meres of the workers. In this figard tl 
experiences in recent strikes should be carefully ah&#  
and in dl cases where atrike mmmitteea resort to givh 
commands, they should be subjected to the most rut- 
V. THE RF,LATIONSHIP B E r n E N  S T R m  COl 
U L Y l V l Y  D U ~ n U L / J S A b L .  - 
 he refo&istr select the atrike opmmibe~~ t h d - 1  
or else endeavor to @cipa& in them. The  
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It is therefore abmluteIy necessary to see to it that 
the strike committees are prevented from falling under 
the influence of soda1 - democracy and the reformist 
trade union bureaucracy and to resolutely fight against the 
wopexation of official represenhtives of reformist trade 
unions on strike committees. No official repvesmtation , 
of r e f m i s t  trade unions should be permitted m the st&& 
committees. The adherents of the Profintern must counter- 
act all the efforta of the representatives of the reformist 
trade unions to  penetrate into the strike committee by 
putting forth the slogan that all membera of the etrike 
committee mud be elected by all the workers, organized 
and unorganized as well. 
It is also neceseary to fight agtrinat the efforta of the 
reformists to limit voting power for the strike committees 
ody  to members of the trade unions. If a reformiat union 
is formally l d g  the strike, one or two representatives 
with consuItative vote may be permitted. so that they may 
report to the committee on the activities of the offi&h 
in the union. AU efforts to weaken the struggle against the 
trade union bureaucracy during the strike on the grounds 
that they are now at the head of the a*ef must be most 
vigorousIy condemned. It  is^ especially during strikes that 
intenagied work kt necesary, exposing the reformist trade 
union bureaucracy, their methods of breaking atrikee, their 
manipuIations behind the hcks of the workem, their con- 
nections with the bourgeoisie, with bourgeok mvernments, 
etc. 
This work of exposure must be c m k i  on not only by 4 
the Party press, not only by the p m ~  of @e trade union 
opposition, but esgecidy by the strike canmiher, ai only 
by eounterpo&g t h e  strike e o m m i b s  to the trade union 
buraucmcy ia it possible to atkin actual independent lead- 
ership of economic struggles. The slighteat i d e o b f i d  or 
organht iod  dependence of the &&kg cmmttttw m the 
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r s f m b t  M e  mion bzareazccraep or $he w e u h i ~ g  of t h  
fight agaiwt it may t& to  the fall in authore'ty of the trade 
I mi&n oppdtion and ths strike committees weated thm its i ~ i t i a tdw e.
I VI. W UNITED FRONT DURING STR- AND LOcKOUTS* 
A sentiment among the masseB very wnducive to the 
creation of a united f r o ~ ~ b  from below ia  arouwd at the 
approach of conflict. On the eve of the conflict it is neces- 
sary to  convert agitation and propaganda for the united 
front into organizational channels. Towarda M a  end the 
following is necesiwy: 
1. The beet and mmt militant workers of aU beliefa,- 
Communists, Socialdemm ts, Ca tholia, unorganized, etc. 
m u s t  be included in id W m  which are elected. 
2. Strike committees mu& ammission various pups* 
comprised of strikers of all beliefs, to make reports to the 
unions, etc,, on the pmgrees of the s m e ,  thus breakhg 
the monopoly In the catholic unions of having regorb 
made only by mtholiw, in the mdd-demowaic unions of 
having them* made onIy by socialdemocrats, e k  
3, It ia necessary to d o w  non-party and reformist 
workers to carry variouar fwnctians within the strike cam- 
mime in order that they may be d m  into the Smm* ) diab struggle. 
4. fn making reports on the activities of the strike 
. f o m n i t t e e ~ ,  the workem (nonparty, ostbolic  am^ m ~ -  
democratic), must see to it that their reports trre grinhd 
in their prem 
5. It is particularly hdpful during strikes and l&ub 
to convene agedial broad conferences of o r g a h d  and rm- 
organized workera (men, women and young workers), In 
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order to pick out and place the best and most energetic 
of them in posh of militant leadership. - 
b 
6. During the strike or lockout special attention must 
be given to the struggle against various combinations 
among the leaders and attempts3 to set up a united fmnt 
from the top. 1 
7. Desarving of the most relentless condemnation are 
those aawent of fhe Profintern who enter into agree 1 
m a t s  with the reformist leadem, for mutual mn-wgmsi- 
on, for the rejection of mutual criticimn, etc, during the [ 
strike. This iis not the united fmnt. This is a malicioue 
perversion of the united front. I ' 
8. United fmnta during sees or lockou% are eshb 
Eshed ta increase the fighing power of the masses, and. 
not for the mutual protection of the Ieadws. That is ~ h 9  
our h e  for a close united fmnt with the workers of the I 
reformist organizations must go hand in hand with the' 
sharpest fight against the reformist trade union bureau- 
cmts. 
9. One of the most effective means of developing the. 
united front, of cementing and welding the ranks of the, 
fighters together, is the organization of mass demonstra- 
tions and parades, under the leadership of the eIected corn-. 
mitteea, against the bourgeois and socialdemocratic police, I 
against the bourgeois and eocia ldemo~tic  lo& authori- 
ties, etc. 
10. The succemful formation of a united fmnt during 
a strike or lockout must be utilized after'the termination 
of the struggle to maintain and strengthen the contach 
which have been established among the muses by the 4 
adherenb of the Profintern What forms this work @hall 4 
take must be decided in aooordanw with the situation in 
each mutry, in the branch of indusw, the relationship 
of f o m a  within the working class, etc  It is absoIuMy I 
esaentirrl to uUze and ditrengben W work accomplished. 
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, VII, WOIRECERS' PICmTS AND D m S E  CORPS. 
The success of strikes in many cases depends upon the 
organization of the picket lines and the ability of the 
strikers to meet the a t w s  of the gangsters a d  the 
strikebreakers in the pay of the employers. In this &gad 
the organization of picketing and workers* defense COW 
assumes an especially important role. The strike or lock- 
out committee must do the following: 
1. Absolutely all workers, no matter what their belief# 
and affiliations, must be drawn into the picket line, in 
such a manner as to have the experiend, militant com- 
rades working together with the unorganized workem, the 
~democrats, catholim, etc. 
2, The leading pickets ahouId be carefully & o m ,  
utilizing not only the young workers, but a1m the older 
workem, men and women, and especially workers' wives. 
3. The very broadest circle of workers must be drawn 
%to the picket line (mass picketing) in order to engage 
the largest possible number of workers in active work 
during the strike. 
4. Special demonstrations of strikers' wives and chil- 
dren against the strikebmkers and the police force de- 
fending the strikebreakers, is very effective. 
6. Picketing must be obligatory upon aU strikers. No 
worker can refuse to carry out this definite duty during 
6. In countries having a fascist regime (Italy, P O W )  
or those having organized employers and reformist shike- 
b d e m  (United Shtes, England, Romania, -) it 
ia necessary from the very inception of the strike to am- 
mence orgmkdng defense corps, drawing into thm corps 
the most active groups of workers. 
7. It is especially deahble to draw into the picket- 
line and into the workers' defense corps, members of work- 
ers' sport organizations, members of pml~kiim wden'o 
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o r g h t i o ~ ,  etc. These a n  play a very impohnt role 
during the  trike. 
8. It k neoesmry to tetrch not only the picketa, but 
aIl the strikem to draw the groper 0011cluslom from the 
conflicts between the pickets and the state authorities, 
pointing out to them the elementary fact-the connection 
exiating between the employers and the Bourgeois govern 
ment. 
9. Especial attention should be given the fight argaimt 
varioua police and private detective organhtioona (factory 
d t h ,  detectives, shop spies, stool pigeons, fire brigada 
which are part of the police force, e k )  
VIII. 'WILl>-CAT'' OR UNOFFICIAL STRIKES* 
The policy of i n k m a t i d  reformism for the "peapeace- 
ful" mlution of all economic conflicts by means of o w  
tory arbitmtion, by agatematic &ow, by the behJral 
of the workem' demmda, places before the bmad maws 
of workem the problems d f'ihting for elementary 
demands without the consent and against the will of the 
reformist trade union bureaucracy. 
"WiTd-c~f' or unofficial strikes, i.e., strikes called by 
the workers themselves without the smction and @mt 
the will of offitid cenbal organg of respective unions, 
were previously only occasional occurences. Now, they are 
becoming the only means of counteracting the increased 
exploitation and pressure of the employera. Strikes with- 
out the mction and againat the will of the union are 
now occuring more and more frequently. They have 
M y  become a mass phenomena, and in the future will 
become more so. Therefore, it is our task to rehabilitate 
the m-qdled "wild-c~t" or tmoBicial strikes, hamuch aa 
the trade union bureaucrats reject the strike as a weapon 
of shggle, 
S e e s  begun and continued without the eonsent of 
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and apaimt the will of the reformist trade unions, espe- 
cially in such countries where the bade union bureaucracy 
in st;iu very strong (England, United States, Germany), 
demand particularly serious prepmtion and the greatest 
effort on the part of the adherenh of the Profintern. 
First of alI it is necessary to overcome, within our 
own mnks, an underegtimation of the strength of the 
workers, m o v e r ~ s t ~ t i o n  f the strength of the reform- 
i s t  trade union bureaucracy and a fear of independent action 
by the workers. It is necessary to carry on daily agita- 
tion and propaganda among the masses, emphasizing the 
fact that the workers have nothing to hope for from the 
reformist trade union Bureaucracy .which acts merely as s 
brake on the workem' struggIe for even their .most ele- 
men* d a m & .  
It is especidly important, when a so-called "wild-c8t' 
or unofficial strike has broken out, to  m u s e  the initiative 
and energy of the masses. Only by bringing the broad 
masses into active partidpation in the straggle will it be 
pomible to break thru the united front of the employem, ' 
bourgeois atate and the retbrmi~t trade union bmucracy. 
IX. BROADENING TRE FIELD OF STRUGG=THE 
PROBLEM OF RESEXlVES. 
Under present mnditiona of truertification and coneen- 
tration of capital each economic conflict raises befom the 
. worlrexs the problem of regerves. In the case of powerful 
employers' organizations, commanding inexhaustible money 
reaemea, relying upon the full force af the bourgeois gov- 
ernment and r e f a d s t  orgaaixationa, every economic mn- 
Mct aassnmes important political significance for the whole 
working clam. Therefore, the problem of lmdenbg the 
struggle, of drawing in new strab of workers and of Inl 
d g  the m e s ,  aersumw ezroeptio~~d impoM08 
from the viewpoint of the development of the &a&e 
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The struggle may be broadened either vertically or 
horizontally, i.e., by embracing a11 workem, or an impor- 
tant part of dI the workem in a given indwtrg, or 
branches of industry IverticalIy), or by involving aU the 
workers in a given geographical territory (horizontally.) 
In either case broadening the struggle is possible only 
after very serious and energetic preparabry work hzt;s 
been carried on among the various categorfes of workem 
More, and especidy during the very height of the con- 
flict. 
The answer to the question, which category of workem 
are to be called upon for aid (i.e., the workers in the 
industry or h the geographical territory,) is to be deter- 
mined by.asmbining which is tbe weakest spot for the 
empIoyers in a given conflict. Firat of all, it is neceasars 
to keep in mind all the s u b s i W e s  connected with a given 
t rust .  Attention must then be given to those concerns 
which provide the raw materials, or which finish the 
manufactured goods. It ia necessary to keep in mind dw 
the possible transference of orders fmm one employer to 
another, the %portation of necessary products or parts 
from other sections of the country, or from abroad, etr,. ' 
A very strong weapon in the struggb is the aid of rail- 
way and waternay transportation workers and the work- 
ers in public service institutiom (eIecMc, gas, e k ) .  
In all these cases, it is necessary to always keep in 
mind the general situation and not ondy our d e b  to 
broaden the ~itruggle. We must consider the e x h t  of our 
influence, the degree of readineas on the part of the mrrss- 
ea and to what extent the massee are ready out of soli- 
darity to join in the struggle. Therefope, we mu& under- 
atand that in the pwpamtory period for the abvggIe and 
during the aurae of the struggle, to imlah the movement 
from the broad proletarian m w e a  and other branches of 
industry would precipitate a very grave danger. 
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X. CONTINUATION OF TIfE STRUGGLE 
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITES 'OF 
THE REFORMISTS. 
Experiences of m n t  atrikes in Nodern 
Ruhr, b d z ,  e k ,  have ahown that the reformisb, 
unable to disrupt the movement from the very 
choose the most appropriate moment during the 
for strikebreakers to M e  the fighting workers 
b&. Taking advantage of their influen- on a c w h k  . 
~trata of workers, and knowing that the most paadve 
elements will dways follow those who propose ending 'the 
strike, the reformis& systematically endmvor to disrupt -. 
one mass movement after another, and do so under the 
banner of socialim 
Usually, the movement is disrupted by mans of ne- -' 
t gotiations d e d  on behind the backs of the workers, 1 
' I  
without the prmieaion or cement of the strikers. That , 
is why the adherenh of the Profintern are faced with 
the task, before and during the strike, of canybg on an ': 
especially determined fight to have a general meeting of . - 
the strikers decide the terms on which the conflict b 
to end. 
In all xecent strikee, the atrikebreaking &tic$ of the 
reformists led to a situation where the majority of work- 
era returned to work (with the exception of the Bhip * 
builders of Hamburg,) rand the adherents of the Pmfhtem 
, 
L were concretely faced with the problem of whether the 
struggIe should or could be continued in those paxticul&r ' 
establishments, or in those certain distri& where they ' i (the adherents of the Profintern) still had the decisive - 
I infIuence, The continuation of the strike in the V i M  ' , 
factories and in Muen after the general a w e  had been 
I broken in Lodz and in Northern m c e ,  m a  perfec:tly 
I' correct, both politidly and tactial1y. Of mum, 8 M n g  
under such circumshceer is extremely dimcult, at the 
workers' strenjgth ia already shattered. The retreat d- 
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fected by the strike-* mciddemucrats and the 
Amsterdamites demoralizes the rrrnkis of the fighters, but 
nevertheless continuation of the strike in certain ~i 
is absolutely neces~ary--otherWise all the strikes 3x1 the 
future will be disrupted by the systematic strikebmakhg 
tactia of the rdormists. 
Continuation of the strike after the majoritg of the 
workem have returned, demands the utmost temcits, ex- 
ceptional solidarity, the highest degree of class mnscioue 
ness, and inexhaustible energy on the part of all who r+ 
maig in the battle. It is only under thew conditiom that 
it is possible, not only to on, but to win thEs partial 
battle. 
E w w e  m e  of such strikes (Vidzeff) have failed, 
the conclusion must not be drawn that such methods of 
struggle me incorrect. It ia mereIy nemerar~r to draw the 
mncIusion, that in simiIAF c a m  the adherents of the Prof- 
intern musrt W e  special augplementary measure8 for the 
organization and mobilization of the masses thruout the 
country to aid those workem fighting on a d l  s&n 
of the sociakt front. 
XI. HOW TO PREVE:NT THE DISRUPIJON 
OF STRIKES. 
The method of systematic strikebreaking by the re- 
formist trade union bureaucracy sharply places before us 
the question of how to prevent the dimption of strikes, 
In t h i s  regard our tasks are spdfied and of a protract4 
nature. Complete insurance against the disruption of the 
movement may ody be attained thru complete elimination 
of reformist influen- among the masses; and therefore, 
the sharper the class war, the more energetically muet 
we fight against the reformist agents of the ca~iMsts 
in the workers' midsk 
The execution of this h k  demands the greatest 
organhtionaf., political and agitationd - pmpagmdht ef- 
forts in uniting the bmad masses on the basis of the dam 
war.  sum^ here depends upon our ability, en-, COB 
siatency, flexibiliw, per~iatency, and what is eqmh& 
important, upon the tempo at which we .extend our pofitiw 
influence, and upon the planned, o r g d t i o n d  c o d *  
tion of this influence. Regarding these p m h W  tasks. 
alI the necessary directives have been given in d e W d  
forma at all Congresses of the W i n t e r n  and the Rvf- 
ht8rn. 
fn order to attain success, it ia necessary: 
1. To sharpen the fight against a?l the allies of capital: 
warping the workem More, and especially during the 
conflict, that the enemy is now within our own d s .  
2. During the elections of the anti-lockout and sMke 
committees and other bodies, to reject the candidacy of 
any per;son connected with the social-democracy or the 
trade union bureaucracy on the ground of their being 
strikebreakers. 
3. To see to i t  that only those persona are elected on 
the leading bodiea who have a l r e d y  p~ovm their devotion 
to the cause of the workins class. 
4. To sharpen the fight during the strike against 
aompdsory arbitration and other bourgeois-reformist 
methods of suppres&g the fight. 
5. To systematically expose the tactics of dwsr ooUab- 
omtion practised by the reformist trade union bureaumy, 
thus breaking the faith of the masses in them. 
6. To immediately react during the strike to every 
auspicious step of the reformist trade union leaders, not 
only in the p m ~ ,  but especially at meetings of s M ~ m t ,  
adopting re~oIutions condemning capitulation, under+mer 
manipulations, and strikebreaking. 
7. To decisively fight against the right of W e  union 
bodies (managem, delegates, meetings, eta) to t h a m e h  
settle the question of ending f ie  strike. 
Them questions must be decided by all the &rkm, 
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organhd and unorganized, and the strike committee, 
elected by the masses of the workers. The main thing is 
to member that organized strikebreaking can ke counter- 
acted only by strong and close org&nization. Therefore, 
it is necessary, before and during the strike, ta strengthen 
the fractions, broaden and strengthen the revolutionary 
trade unions and the trade union opposition, and step by 
shp to organizationally develop our incmuing politid in- 
fluence. It is especially during big strikes that dl the 
instruments of the Party, trade union opposition and 
revolutionary trerde unions must put forth their maximum 
& o h  to h w  new strata of workers into active struggle 
against the strikebreaking reformists. 
Only the most stubborn and systematic e£€orta towards 
the strengthening and welding of our rmka will make it 
possible for ns to defeat the strikebreakers a d  s u m s -  
fully terminate the conflict against the united front of 
the employem, the bourgeois h t e  and the reformist trade 
union bureaucracy. 
ftII. STRIKE3 IN COUNTRIES WITH DrVIDED TRADE 
UNION MOVEMENTS. 
Revolutionary trade unions in countries with divided 
W e  union movements (France, Czecho-Slovrrkia, Rouma- 
nia, Greece, Japan, etc.,) in applying international political 
and tactid experiences in economic struggles, are faced 
with a whole series of specific problems, which are espe- 
cially sharply raised at the time of maas movements. 
Wherem in wch countries ae Gemany and England, the 
fight for the leadership of the massets irr carried on be- 
tween the official organs and the opposition, in countries 
with a divided bade unim movement, the fight for in- 
fluence over the masses is carried on between two organ- 
i%atiom. I 
In such a situation one of the most important bsks 
befow the revolutionary unions is the utilization of each 
wnomic conflict to strengthen their godtion, w- 
' the base of the revolutionary M e  d o n a  by bh&b 
in new members from among the unorg-, at thtt ex- 
pense of the reformist trade unions. EveryWng ~ & &  
must be done, during, and immediately fobwing mass 
movements, to liquidate m l e l  reformkt organhtim, by 
transferring all the members, or an overwhelming m a j o ~  
ity of them, into the ranla of the revolutioqarg nniom 
(see the resolution of the IV Congress of the -tern 
on the first item of the agenda). 
In this regard, the evrienwa gained in Bordeaux 
during the strike of the longshoremen, where the refom- 
.I ist union8 completely disappeared because their members 
bsferred into the Unitarian Union, are worthy of -aeri- 
ous study and dupliation. Regarding those reformiat 
trade unions, fmm which we have won over only part of 
the membership during, or immediately after the strike, 
measms should be taken to strengthen, politically and 
organizationally, the influence of the revolutionary oppoai- 
tion within these uniom, in order ta win over the majority 
of the membership, thus creating the condition for the li- 
quidation of these reformist trade unions. 
On the other hand, in the face of the ercistence of two 
- parallel, competing unions, it is essential,thstt the rev+ 
Iutionarg unionrt be extremely sensitive in regbtering the 
moods of the masses and the stages of the fight against 
the demagogy of the refomkt leaders, who are dwagii 
ready to simulate skuggle for the sake of retaining their 
infIuence over the mernbemhip. In ~uch  countriw, it b 
especially dangerous for the adherents of the Frofinterm 
to permit the initiative to slip from their hands. We must 
not be deceived by the left phrases of the reformist lead- 
' em or truet in their abilitg. and desire to actu&lIy carry 
on the struggle agthat the bourgeoisie. This would lead 
directly to the destruction oi the revo~utionary trade union 
It is understood, of mwr~e, in m a  where a local union 
affiliated to a r e f o h t  center really wages a fight 
against the employers, that it is the tads of the revolution- 
ary uqion to enter into a united front with this local union, 
Wing precautions, however, against any possible tenden- 
cies tawards capitulation especially during decisive m* 
menta of the strike. We must lead all the workers, those 
organized in unions, as well as, and especially, the un- 
organid, thereby demonstrating in practice that only 
the revolutionary W e  uniom are cowistent defendem of 
the interests of the toiling maeses. Therefore the fevo- 
lutionary o r ~ t i o m  must W e  themselves on eIected 
strike committees and establish the closest cooperation 
with them. . 
Only a m m t  policy in the leadership of ecunomic 
struggles can raise the authorits of the revolutionary 
trade unions among the maaes, and ntrengthen them 
poIitidy and organizationally. Thus can the revolution- 
ary trade uniom be converted into organizations embracing 
the majority of the working dam. 
xm. STRIKES IN FASCIST AND WHITE TERROR 
COUPJTRIES. 
In countries where fascism and the white terror reign, 
the overwhelming majorib of strikes are eporadic sfxikeg. 
This means that in these countries the adherenb of the 
Profintern hhve thus far been unable to penetrate into 
the factories, despite the measures of repression, in order 
to influence the pulling of s w e s ,  the demands, and the 
results of strtkes. Consequently it is specially important 
in countries of this type, to work directly inside the fac- 
tory. For it is only from within the factory that economic 
and political movements may rise and be given vent. 
In countries where the very presentation of economic 
demands ie punishable by law, the pmblem k neverthelem 
to draw the largest number of workers into the taslr of 
I 
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working out and presenting their economic demands. The 
demands should prepared according to crafts, and 
should be presented to the management by large delegar 
tiom of from 100 to 200 workers. This, howevex, muat 
by no means be taken as a strict and fast rule to be 
applied to all countries. Changes muat be made according 
to peculiar conditiom existing in each fascist or white 
terror country. Aho, under no drcumstances should the 
delegation be mmposed of all the leading active workers. 
I We mwt not expose all the leading active workera to 
measmres of repression and terror practiced by the aemy. 
Delegates should and must be elected to take up questions 
even of the slightest importance which immediately con- 
cern the interests of the workers. 
In those countries, it is especially important to choose 
a staunch and determined hitrike committee. During d m  
; tiona of strike m m i t h s  the possibility of m ~ t a  nd 
repressions must be kept in mind ; therefore, a, amall group 
I which could continue the leadership of .the rstrike in case 
of meats or repreasiom must be chosen out of the broad- 
i er strike committee. In these countries- information and connections are cspeciany important, and for this purpose it is nece88ar.v to set up an illegal apparatus. A ~trikers' defense corps, 
cumposed directly of workera, against the fascist band3 
is of great importance in these oountries. It is most im- 
portant during every strike to stubbornly strive ta come 
out into the open and utilize the slightest hitch during 
the strike to come up from underground 
XIV. HOW TO GIVE POLITZCAL CONTENT 
C 
TO STRIKES, 
Because of the concentration of capital and the practie 
of the bourgeoisie and refomists to m p h  strikes by 
obligatory arbitration, every strike acquires golitid char- 
, acter, Thi~  doe8 not mean that all the workers undemhd 
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the political, i.e., the $ e n d  class eigniricmce of -the 
current economic struggles. In this situation, it is the 
task of the wdherenh of the Profintern to teach the 
mmsea politim on the basis of the everyday struggle. 
This memu it is necessary tb issue slogans at each stage 
of the akuggle, on the basis of the demands, which will 
raise the f ih t  to a higher level. 
To give politid content to sMkes does not mean to 
talk about @ti= in the absbct, but it means b 00~~1ect 
up the immediate demands with demands of a more gen- 
eral character. 
The rndority of strikes suf€er from xepreasion, gov- 
ernment protection of strikebreakers, obliga,tory arbitra- 
tion, etc. The principal thing ia to have the workm un- 
derstand frm h&~ experknees i* the e t w g p k  thut the gov- 
mmerct i s  pmt&irag the employers against the workers, 
that the courts, p a s ,  church, eh., which are isupposed 
to be beyond the &uses, are also in the pay of the em- 
ployers. The woikers muat realize that every large 
economic conflict means the placing of class e t  h. ,I  
It is important not to put forth h many slogans at one 
time and to remember that ody that political slogan will 
be of any value which i8' closely connected with the 
development and the circumsbncea of the given economic 
conflict. Militant political sfogans (demsnds) flowing from 
a given skrike, maJr in their entirety aomprise that 
united political platfom upon which the workers of all 
political beliefs (including the non-Party workers) may 
unite. 
The enthushum prevailing among the maws during 
strikes should be utilirted for atrengthening the campaign 
for the defense of the Soviet Union. Every worker must 
understand the very dose connection between the prepara- 
tions for war against the proletarian atate, and the in- 
tensification of all means of expIoitation, repmion and 
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hrmr which a p i b h n  is forcing upon him for the a k e  
of capitalist stabilization. During strikes the revolutiomry 
trade unions must give e1pwh1 attention to mobilizing the 
p workers in those industries which can easily be converted into war industries. Also, among the d m y  workers it 
I is necessary to b p u h h  the slogans of the general 
strike, mass strikes and tying up of kramqmrtation in war 
time. In the struggle against imperialist war it is neces- 
sary to f i h t  against all foms of milihry organizations 
and militarization functioning in the m hops and factories. 
XV. FORMS AND METHODS OF ORGANIZING THE 
TRADE UNION OPPOSITION (LEFT WING) 
IN ALL COENTRIES. 
1, Exgeriences of recent sMkes in France, Germany and Polmd have shown that 10-1 organizations do not receive 
sufficient aid and support during strikes, from the Party, 
revolutionary b i d e  union centers, and the trsde union op 
position. At the aame time, the revolutionary trade unions 
and the trde union opposition can give d v e  lademhip 
only on the condition that we are able to mobilize d2 
. the forces at oar diapod. Therefore, the most important 
tasks before the revolutiomry unions and the opposition 
are the following : 
1. At the approach of a conflict in some industrg to 
transfer our best forces to the place of battle, 
2. To adopt all our agitation and propaganda to the 
importance and significance of the conflict. 
3. To give spedd apace in the press to t h e  conflict, 
drawing the strikers in as correspondents. 
4. To concentrate all the work of the revolutionarg 
unions, and the trade union opposition towards aiding the 
strike. To change the routine work of the unions in such 
a manner as to afford the strike the maximum assistance. 
6. To institute a strict check-up on a militmy f m h g  
over the activities of everyone d g n e d  ta a definih 
branch of work. 
6. To &we spe& attmth du&ng the eErike to draw 
ing new f m e s  i ~ t o  the J d i ~ g  cmrraittses from among the 
raab of the worker-, wonam a@ ~ m w g  workws- 
involved in the conflict of thia bran& of indus*. Hun- 
dreds and thousands of workers can be found who would 
carry on a tremendous amount of voluntary work. 
7, To establish permanent, live contact between the 
leading committees of ahgg le  and the central leadership 
of the revolutionary W e  Upiom. 
8. In order to' mobme all forces for the support of 
the struggle, the workem in the immediate leademhip 
must truthfully report the situation am it is, without lend- 
ing it m y  color. 
XVX. WORK AMONG WORKING WOMEN AND 
WORKING CLASS HOUSE'FKIVES. 
Drawing women into the strike w u m e s  especial im- 
portance in connection with the rationalization of industry 
and the growth of f e d e  labor, Experiences have pmven 
that working women and wivea of workers play a very 
large role in atriErea and l&uts, and therefore, it is 
necesamy : 
1. While work is still in its prepmtory stage, to give 
special sttention to the organization of working women, 
and to include in the general demands, such demands 
as especially concern m e n .  hw . 
2. To draw working women and workers' wivk "mto 
active work at the outbreak of the strike, charging them 
with various functiom of an agitationd and o r ~ t i a ~  
chamcter, d e f  work, e k ,  md creating for thia purpose 
during the  trike tqwid committees composed of atxikers* 
wives. 
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3. To crerPte special flJring ;squadmns of working women 
to work among working claw hou8ewivea. 
4. In dating anti-lixkout or &ike d t t e q  to we 
tn it that a.n&'idmt pementage of working women arr! 
included. In those factories where the vast majorie of 
. work- rn women, the majorily of the strike committee 
- must be composed of wome~l 
5. All delegations for the p- of estabbldng eon- 
* with other Wm and other fndtu@m mu& -. 
lately include working women. 
' 6. If a large number of working faomen are invoked 
in a  trike or lockon& it b n e w m y  to wvoke spwhl 
working  women'^ confereneea ta prepare "m organized Eorm 
the general demands of the working women, and h main- 
tain the most active women workem on s i k e  committees, 
However, this by no means should exdude the working 
women from holding general confm~1~8s with the working 
men; on the wntrsyt this ia absolutely nwwmy, ' 
7. In view of the fact that in liquidating strikes, E+ 
formkta usually rerrch an agreement with the employera 
at the expense of the weakest categories aP the proletariat 
(women workem and young workers) it ia necmary, w' 
W y  t o w d  the termbtim of the adlick to aee to it 
that the interest of these categories are pmkcted. 
XVIL FORMS AND ~ ~ O D S  OF ORGANIZING 
YOUNG WORKERS. 
h r h g  economic confl ih s@d atbtion should be 
paid to p m m  the hkah of the young woxkem and 
d r a m  them into d v e  work. In woddq out tbe 
d d ,  it b ahIntdy newwary to incInde iqmM pdnb 
the labor of young workem, and during eI&= 
of committeeis, young workmi mmt be drawn in on an 
equtrl footing. with ddt workem. YO- workem can play 
.a d&ve rola on the picket be, in defeme cow, h the 
l e s b b K & h g  of contacts, in checking up the execution of 
decbions made by the lading bodia, in the distribution 
of strike committee leaflets, etc, e k  A de&rmiq+d battle 
must be waged against the socialdemocmtic tradition of 
considering young workers as a category undeserving of 
any attention. 
The adherenh of the Profintern must remember that 
the activization of the whole movement depends to a great 
extent upon its ability to draw masses of young workers 
into the sbugg1e. 
It would be desirable to ereate you& mmmksions on 
all strike committeen for s p e w  work among the youth, 
in order to draw all the young workers and studenta into 
a well knit strike front. 
13Vm. ORGANJ[WNG S T R m  RELIEF. 
Dnring zt atrike the quwtion of relief is very important 
In view of the fact that t0e refomkt uniom mbotage 
the movement, often dalarmg it to be an outlaw e w e  
in order to justify their refusal to give aid to the strikers, 
and further, that the refoFmista look with eontempt upon 
€he unorganized, refusing them even the most meagre 
relief, it is the task of the tmde union opposition and the 
strike committees to procure the greatest possible amount 
of relief for the workers on strike and those locked out. 
For this purpose it is n e c e a w :  
1, To demand that the unions give assistance to dI 
locked out and striking workers. 
2. To demand that the union allow a definite sum as 
strike knefit for the unorganized. 
8. To arrange wcial collections among all workers 
-out the country for relief funds to be distributed 
among the organized as weU as the unorganized. 
4. To draw into this h k  the Workers International 
Relief, which must function as an auxiliary organization 
during economic struggles. In countries where independent 
trade union organizations exist, it is the task of these 
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tmions to give.&& to the 
tions of the Workers fnhma 
cipate in this work. 
To give partialax attention to the need of 
work it will be n m s w y  to ovemme the 
the cooperative funct iode 
strikes as no affairs of theira. 
& To place before city committees and garhmenb 
o w  demands for the relief of ~trikem' and Iocked oat work- 
ers' md their families, These d-ds muat be mmwked 
and emphasized by delegations and demoashtiom of tbe 
XIXI THE PROELm OF INFORMATION AND ' 
CONNECTIONS. 
The W c  b k  during strikes i~ ta connect the elect& 
a to what is happening. For this purpose it is necmwy: 
, 
1. To have regular meetings of the strike committee. 
Regular reports of those meefhgs are to be made to the 
strikers. 
2. To hzve regular repoxts in the press on the deve- 
lopment of the strike. 
8. To have the strike committee publieb a iqdd 
paper or bulletin bmed on a united platform for W 
struggle. mts organ must #my regalsr r e p o h  on the 
development of the strike, the dv i t i ea  of the &trike 
committee with regard to relief, e k  
4. To EZE€UUY follow and to deny, thra the generid 
left wing press and the stnke committee balletin, wew- 
king that the burgeoia and aociddemocratic prm wri& 
about the ~Hka 
i 6. For information and con& to UW the W u r k d  qwrt o x g m h t i m ,  mch as bicycle m s ,  mdio 811th~- 
PROBLEMS OF STRIKE STRATEGY 
aimta, etc. Physical training chams mu& .and should be 
utilized during a w e s  for eshblbhing a permanent con- 
k t  between the workers of various shopa and various 
dia&icta. 
XX. ESTABLISHING CONTACrS WITH TRADE 
UNION ORGANIZATZONS IN OTHER 
COUNTRn3S. , 
Notwithstanding the fact that the conflicts in Northern 
France in Munchen-Gladbach, and in Lo& o c m d  almosq 
simultan80wly, there waa no contact between these vari- 
ous workem Such contad during the strike would have 
been of great bendt. Themfom, in this regard it b 
n-sary to do the following: 
L It is deElirable to dect special delegatiom to e ~ t a b  
liah contact with workers of other distxicts and industria 
2. In the c a ~  of huge strike, it ia deshbIe that the 
strike commithe appeal to all workem in foreign coaxlkiesi 
for mpporL 
3. Infomatin should be releamd to the intemat£onal 
pmss an the development of the strike and the metho& 
of struggle. 
4. Send regular reports to the Profintern and Com- 
intern xegarding every detail of the conflict. 
5. Expose the inactivity and antagonism of the m 
formist interntionah to the strike. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
In conclusion, we wish to draw to the attention of all 
the adhe~nts of 'the Profintern that the ~esolutiona 
adopted at the IX plenum of the Executive Conunittee of 
the Communist International, the nT Congress of the Red 
International of Trde Unions and the VI Congress of the 
Communist Inknational =garding the gmblems of work- 
ing within the trade uniom are still in force. h a m u c h a ~  
the economic stmggle become the center of attention 
for all Communist parties, r e ~ l u t i ~  trade unions and 
r m d u ~  opposition, the ComInbm and the BdnterP 
will most carerhxlly follow all economic conflict& They 
will m t  timely to an the developnenb in tbeae mnflicb 
in each cormtry, a d  render dl the aid within their power 
dnring the P-~V perlod, w, 4 
ttt the o u t b ~  of 1 s b i ,  Only wi th EU& combined 
hted orgmhations, is it psible, with the m d m m n  h 
fit to the international working elm movement, ta u m  . 
the p a t  economic: conflicts and take the Ieadership of the 
m a a m  out of the hands of inhmationcrl reformism. 

